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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO LAW
The following is a summary of material presented on October
23, 1953, at the 55th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation. This is the fourth annual survey of developments in Colo-
rado law and was prepared and presented under the direction of
Gordon C. Johnston, dean of the University of Denver College of
Law. Subjects have been grouped arbitrarily to best suit the abili-
ties of the attorneys who prepared the material. Subjects not re-
viewed in this issue will be published in the January, 1954, issue
of Dicta.-Editor.
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
EDWARD C. KING of the Bounlder Bar
LEGISLATION
The following are changes in the statutory law relating to wills
and estates which were made in 1953 and which appear in Session
Laws of Colorado 1953. References are to chapters.
Chapter 111 relates to the distribution of property by the trus-
tee of an express trust, when such distribution is made pursuant
to the exercise of, or in default of, the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment. The law is for the protection of trustees. Its effect can
best be illustrated 'by an example, as follows: Suppose that "A"
by will has created a trust for the benefit of his wife "B" for life,
with remainder as she shall by will appoint and in default of ap-
pointment to "C". The wife "B" dies, apparently intestate and in de-
fault of appointment the trustee distributes the remainder of the
estate of "C". Shortly thereafter a will of the wife "B" is found and
is admitted to probate in Colorado. This will appoints the remainder
to "D". In the absence of statute the trustee would be liable to
"D" for the amount of the remainder improperly distributed to "C".
The new statute provides, however, that if such erroneous
distribution is made not sooner than six months after the death of
the donee of such power ("B" in the illustration) the trustee shall
not be responsible to "D".
The statute also provides that the trustee shall not be liable
for distribution pursuant to the exercise of a power made in an
invalid instrument, if the trustee is not aware of the invalidity.
Chapter 124 contains an amendment to the gift tax law which
provides that if a donor dies, or has a guardian or conservator
appointed, before making a return which he should have made,
his personal representative shall make such return.
Chapter 132, relating to inheritance taxes, provides for com-
promise or arbitration when there are conflicting claims as to the
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death.
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Chapter 156 makes substantial changes in that portion of
Chapter 93, 1935 C.S.A., which relates to homesteads. It makes
changes in the method of creating a homestead, in the wording
relative to sale of homesteaded property on execution, in the treat-
ment of exempt proceeds used for another home which becomes
a homestead, in the disposition of insurance on improvements on
the homestead and in conveying or encumbering homesteaded prop-
erty. These matters are merely mentioned as a warning that the
new act should require careful study. Only one portion of the new
act would appear to relate directly to wills and estates and that
is the new section 29 (A) which provides that if property is en-
tered as a homestead by a joint tenant who is the husband or wife
of the other joint tenant, then upon the death of either spouse the
homestead shall continue in effect on the interest in such property
of the surviving spouse. The same is true upon the death of a joint
tenant leaving an orphan child or children as surviving joint
tenants.
Chapter 250 provides that no act of a fiduciary appointed by
a court shall be invalid solely by reason of any order thereafter
entered revoking or setting aside the appointment, or by reason
of revocation of the probate of a will or by a finding of mental
competency.
Chapter 251 is the result of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Hoff v. Armbruster, 125 Colo. 198,1 decided in March, 1953,
where the court found that the mutual and recipifocal wills of a
husband and wife were contractual and, in effect, irrevocable. The
case merely confirmed the rule which had been in effect in Colo-
rado since the case of Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 400,2 but it
alarmed many attorneys and it was sought to change the rule by
this act which provides that to establish an agreement to make a
will, such agreement must be proved clear, satisfactory and con-
vincing evidence, and that the fact that two or more wills were
executed at or about the same time by different persons shall not
of itself be evidence that such wills were made in consideration
of each other.
The first part of the act merely states the existing law, for
it has been said in a number of cases that the evidence to estab-
lish such a contract must be clear, strong and unequivocal.
The latter phrase of the act seems ineffective because it has
never been the law, either before or after the Armbruster case,
that if two or more wills are executed at or about the same time
that in itself is evidence that they were made in consideration of
each other. It is the reciprocal and mutual aspect of the wills that
has lead the court to consider them contractual, rather than the
fact that they were both made on Monday. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the act makes no change in the existing law.
1242 P. (2d) 604.
2 194 P. 943. (1920)
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The act does raise a question of considerable importance. Sec-
tion 8 of our Statute of Frauds says that every contract for the
sale of lands shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing.
It has been held that a contract to make a will of real estate falls
within this section. Could it be said that it was the purpose of the
new act to substitute clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
for the writing required by the Statute of Frauds?
Chapter 252, the new spouse's allowance statute, is in some
respects very confusing. The following are the most important
new features of this act:
a. It provides that if real estate is used by the owner and
family as a home, and the owner shall die or be adjudged in-
competent, the court, after hearing, may permit the spouse or
minor children to remain in possession without payment of
rent upon such terms as the court directs.
b. It also provides that upon the death of a person the
court may make reasonable provision for the surviving spouse
or the minor children of decedent after appointment of a
fiduciary for such estate, and that all payments made for such
purpose shall be deducted from the widow's or children's al-
lowance.
c. The widow's or children's allowance is increased to
$3,500.
d. It provides that if a widow and children (not children
of the widow) survive decedent the allowance is apportioned
between them in such manner as the court deems just.
e. It provides that when a person shall be adjudged a
mental incompetent the court may set over to the spouse or
minor children, such articles of personal property "as it
deems necessary for the use of such former spouse or minor
children, and may make such allowances for the support of the
spouse and minor children as the court may direct but not
exceeding $3,500 until claims are paid." Just what is meant
by a former spouse is not clear.
Chapter 253 has to do with the death, resignation or removal
of fiduciaries. It is too long and involved to examine here. It takes
the place of Sections 90, 91, and 92 of Chapter 176, C.S.A. 1935.
Chapter 254. The statute relating to determination of heir-
ship in cases where heirship has not been determined during the
County Court administration of an estate has never seemed en-
tirely satisfactory. The law was amended in 1951 and now again
it is amended by this Chapter 254. The principal changes made
by the new law are as follows:
I. Section 29, Chapter 176, C.S.A. 1935 as amended in
1951 is further amended by adding a proviso that no mailing
of a copy of the notice shall be necessary where a consent has
been executed or the heir has been personally served or has
waived or acknowledged service of notice.
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2. Section 33, Chapter 176 as amended in 1951, which
provided that proceedings under the act might be joined with
an action affecting real property under the Rules and that
in the event of such joinder the proceeding shall be conducted
in compliance with the Rules, is repealed effective January
1, 1954.
3. A new section 33 states that in event of joinder the
complaint shall set forth the matters required for the petition
under the Act, the alleged heirs shall be joined as defendants,
and the proceeding conducted in accordance with the Rules.
There is doubt, however, as to the validity of this new
section 33 as it appears to have been inserted improperly in
the Act.
Chapter 255 amends the small estates law by changing the
size of small estates from $500 or less to $1,000 or less.
Chapter 256 relates to a joint federal income and gift tax
returns and provides that on petition of a personal representative
he shall have authority, when authorized by the County Court, to
join with the decedent's spouse or a ward in a joint federal in-
come tax return, to require such indemnity as the court may deem
proper, to consent to gifts made by the spouse of a decedent or
ward, for federal gift tax purposes, and to enter into contracts
with the spouse of a decedent or ward in respect to joint income
tax returns.
Chapter 257 amends Sec. 217, Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. relating
to reports of fiduciaries. It requires that every fiduciary shall file
with the court every six months after his appointment a report
in the form and manner as the court may require, until the estate
is fully settled, etc. While the act is one concerning estates, it im-
mediately raises the question whether all fiduciaries, including
testimentary trustees not subject to court jurisdiction and trustees
under living trusts, are now required to file reports. Certainly they
are fiduciaries and certainly the act contains no exception. It
again demonstrates the danger of using the word "fiduciary"
without discrimination.
Chapter 268 relates to wills offered for probate under Sec. 60,
Ch. 176, 1935 C.S.A. and injects a number of new requirements
as to procedure when wills are contested under the provisions of
Sec. 63 of Ch. 176. The details of the new provisions cannot be
be considered here, but in any case where there is a will contest
this chapter should be referred to, as it makes important changes.
The old law provided that a date for the hearing on a will
should be not less than ten or more than sixty days after the peti-
tion is filed. This new act omits the ten-day provision.
DECISIONS
The only Colorado cases decided by the Supreme Court during
the year which relates to Wills and Estates and which seem worthy
DICTA
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of comment are the following:
Ostad v. Sarconi,.3 ------- Colo ......... 252 P. 2d 94 (Dec.
22, 1952). Will contest. The court held that in determin-
ing whether or not the question of undue influence should
be submitted to the jury every favorable inference fairly
deducible, and every favorable presumption fairly aris-
ing, from the evidence, must be considered as facts proved
in favor of contestants.
Broadhead v. Robinson,4 254 P. 2d 857 (Feb. 9, 1953).
This was a case in which the Manager of Revenue filed a
claim against an estate for back personal property taxes
on jewelry found among decedent's possession at the time
of her death. It was held that the claim was subject to
hearing and determination as in civil action in courts of
record, subject to the proviso that the claimant could not
prove the claim by his own oath. The burden of proof was
on claimant and the statutory presumption that the assess-
ment rolls are prima facie evidence of the validity of a
tax does not shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer.
Cunningham v. Stender,5 255 P. 2d 977 (March 30,
1953). A will which is attacked on the ground of lack of
mental capacity of the testator may be upheld if it repre-
sented the wishes of the testatrix and she (1) understood
the nature of her act, (2) knew the extent of her property,
(3) understood the disposition she was making and (4)
knew the natural object of her bounty.
In re MeGarys Estate,6 258 P. 2d 770 (May 25, 1953).
This interesting case held that, in the absence of an at-
testation clause, due execution of a will cannot be pre-
sumed merely from the fact that the signatures of the
testator and witnesses are genuine. No cases were cited.
The decision is based, and apparently with justification,
on the terms of Sections 39 and 61, ch. 176, and Laws of
1947, Ch. 340, Sec. 1. The rule seems, however, to be rather
harsh because in most states due execution of the will is
evidenced by the mere fact that the witnesses have signed.
In re Clayton's Estate, 259 P. 2d 617 (June 29, 1953).
This case, as its name indicates, had to do with the will
of George W. Clayton, who died in 1899, and certain as-
pects of which were passed upon by the Supreme Court
forty years ago. The will gave the residue of the estate
to the City of Denver in trust for the Clayton College.
31952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 10.
41952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 12.
81952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 17.
61952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 22.
11952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 25.
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The question here for decision was the validity of a lease
to the Park Hill Golf Club made by the Trust Commission
which was created by city ordinance to administer the
trust. The City contended that the lease was void because
the Trust Commission had no power to lease and because
the lease was not approved by the County Court. It was
held that the City was estopped to deny the validity of its
own ordinance, that the power to lease was clearly im-
plied by the terms of the will which directed administra-
tion of the trust to produce income and that no order of
court was needed because, for the purpose, an implied
power is the same as an expressed power.
Means v. Simon,8 260 P. 2d 598 (August 3, 1953).
In this complicated case "A" had sold real estate to "B".
"A" was adjudged a mental incompetent and "C" ap-
pointed her conservator. The conservator succeeded in
setting aside the sale and was ordered to pay the pur-
chase money which had been received by "A" into the
registry of the court. The conservator, "C", withdrew the
money from a savings account and died without paying it
to the court. "C2" was then appointed conservator and
filed a claim against the estate of "Cl", claiming the
money was a trust fund in the hands of both "A" and his
conservator. The court held that it was not a special trust
fund in the hands of either "C" or his estate.
Thuet v. Thuet,9 260 P. 2d 204 (July 20, 1953). Lena
Thuet, who owned a farm, in 1942 executed a deed con-
veying the property to her daughter, Marie, and delivered
the same to a bank with a letter of instruction. This letter
stated that the deed was delivered to the bank without
power of recall, that it was to take effect presently and
that upon the death of the grantor the deed was to be de-
livered to the said Marie, the grantor reserving the privi-
lege of occupancy during her life. The deed was executed
and delivered to the bank without the knowledge of the
grantor's husband or the grantee. After the death of the
grantor it was sought to have the deed declared void on
the ground that it was in fraud of the husband's prop-
erty rights, that the property remained under control of
the grantor and that the transfer was colorable and testa-
mentary. In deciding for the grantee the court said that
the owner of property has the right to convey the same
without the consent or knowledge of the spouse, that a
deed may be delivered to a third person with instructions
to deliver it to the grantee upon the grantor's death and
that it is not essential to a valid delivery that the grantee
knows of the deed's existence.
1952-52 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 27.
01952-53 C.B.A. Advance Sheet No. 26.
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OIL AND GAS LAW, WATER LAW, EQUITY
PAUL C. LENNARTZ of the Sterling Bar
OIL AND GAS
Our advance sheets contained only one case concerning oil and
gas, which stems from a factual situation arising in Sterling.
Brown v. Kirk * covers a situation which arises more frequently
in oil areas than one generally imagines. The first grantor reserved
one-fourth of the minerals in his deed to grantee. When that
grantee (plaintiff here) conveys, he reserves one-half of the mine-
rals, making no mention of his grantor's one-fourth reservation,
but intends to reserve an additional and full one-half in himself.
The contract of sale was no more specific than the deed. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court, and held that when the deed
is unambiguous, the intention of the parties is determined there-
from and extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to explain same;
that the words "except" and "reserve" were synonymous as used in
the conveyance; and that the grantee had reserved for himself,
not one-half, but one-fourth.
The important statutes passed by the legislature in 1953, that
is those statutes which are of interest to the general practitioner,
were:
1. Severance tax (indexed under "Income Tax" in the
1953 Session Laws).
2. Authorities to counties to excute 5-year term oil and
gas leases or for 10 years if lease carries non-drilling clause
(indexed under "Counties" in 1953 Session Laws).
3. Authority to school boards to execute 10-year oil and
gas leases (indexed under "Schools" in 1953 Session Laws).
WATER
Colorado Springs v. Public Utilities Commission I merely re-
states the holding in Englewood v. Denver 2 that a home rule city
serving water outside its corporate limits is not a public utility
under the jurisdiction of the P.U.C.
Downing v. Copeland 3 was an action to enjoin defendants'
interference with plaintiffs' use of water. Plaintiffs, owning land
and an appurtenant water right, diverted water from a stream.
A channel was built 424 feet in the creek-bed upstream on defend-
ants' lands. Defendants had a ditch with a junior right with a
head-gate one mile upstream from plaintiffs. Defendants took
water when plaintiffs wanted and needed it. The channel had been
built several years prior to this action by plaintiffs. There was
........ Colo..........-257 P. 2nd 1045 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh, No. 21, p. 325.
........ Colo .......... 248 P. 2d 311 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv Sh. No. 1, p. 2.
123 Colo. 290, 229 P. 2d 667.
S.... ... Colo .......... 249 P. 2d 539 (1952) 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 4, p. 51.
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evidence that defendants at the time consented to the change.
Judgment for defendants reversed and remanded. The Supreme
Court held that original point of diversion had not been changed
as the new ditch was dug from the old point along the bed of the
stream and thus no application for a change was needed. Plaintiffs'
right to use and divert included the right to make and change the
necessary dams, channels or other diversion works within the
stream bed which might be necessary to enable them to use their
original headgate, where no additional burden on defendants re-
sults therefrom.
Williams v. Great Western Sugar Co.4 was an action for
breach of warranty and misrepresentation in a deed executed by
the sugar company to one of plaintiff's predecessors in title. In a
prior action, from which no appeal had been taken, the lower court
decreed that ditch company stock may limit the use of water to
a specific tract of land. In this case, the Supreme Court held that
the entire question had been previously adjudicated, that all sub-
sequent grantees of defendant had notice of the prior litigation
and resulting decree, and upheld summary judgment in favor of
defendant issued in lower court.
Quirico v. Hickory JaIcson Ditch Company 5 was an action
by the ditch company to enjoin defendants' use of water. Defend-
ants had diverted water from their headgate since about 1914.
The plaintiff Ditch Company set up a decree of 1919 to the Ala-
mosa Ditch and also asserted a right to use water being used by
defendants through a contract and filing of application for bene-
ficial use. The original decree was re-opened in 1924 without notice
to the defendants and plaintiff awarded water, and again in 1934
without notice to defendants, plaintiff had decree re-opened and
water now in question adjudicated to it. Plaintiff stands on the
2 and 4-year statute of limitation (Chapter 90. Sec. 183, C.S.A.).
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that the
statute does not operate against one without notice where he knew
nothing of the decrees nor had been molested in his use until after
the 4-year limit; therefore, the statute does not start to run until
he receives notice.
Peterson v. Water Conservation District 6 was presumably
an action to adjudicate title to water. Defendants, junior appro-
priators, contend that plaintiff had no water right by reason of
abandonment. "A", a corporation, owned land and certain de-
creed water rights. In 1915 a deed of trust covering the land and
water rights was given to "B". "C", Ranch Manager, and majority
stockholder of "A", testified that he abandoned said water rights
in 1920. "B" foreclosed its Deed of Trust in 1923, and deed sub-
sequently issued to "B". "B" sold to "D", the plaintiff, in 1929,
4 ........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 912 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 937 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
........ Colo ---....... 254 P. 2d 422 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
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and by tax sale in 1929 said land and water rights vested in "E",
who then conveyed back his interest to "D", the plaintiff, in 1930.
Since 1930 there was no evidence of abandonment but only evi-
dence of use of less water than originally decreed. Trial court held
for defendants. Reversed and remanded by Supreme Court which
held that even if you assume "C" had the right to abandon the
rights of "A", the corporation, the equity owner, he could not
abandon the rights of "B" in the position of mortgagee under their
deed of trust, and that "B", mortgagee, must also abandon the
rights under the mortgage. The equity owner has not more right
to abandon mortgagee's rights than he does to sell such rights out
from under the security of the mortgage.
Granby Ditch Co. v. Hallenbeck 7 was an action to adjudicate
title to water. Plaintiff ditch company held decreed 1894 rights for
10 cubic feet per second from Dirty George Creek. Plaintiff asks
to establish claim for water diverted and intercepted below its de-
creed headgate on the basis of adverse user for over 56 years. De-
fendants, subsequent appropriators, appeared at statutory appro-
priation proceedings where their priorities were established. Plain-
tiff did not appear at these proceedings to assert and establish
their claim. Judgment of lower court was affirmed. The court held
that abandoned water did not go to adverse user, but to subse-
quent appropriators in the order of their decreed priority; that
one who openly and adversely diverts water for 56 years without
a decree loses all rights if he fails to appear at statutory adjudica-
tion proceedings to assert his rights against subsequent claimants.
In Holbrook Irrigation District v. Adcock 8 the plaintiff irri-
gation district brought an action for declaratory judgment to de-
termine defendants' rights to irrigation water. The plaintiff ac-
quired the rights and facilities of a canal company subject to all
contracts previously made by the canal company. Plaintiff then
enlarged the system with additional dams, reservoirs and canals.
Under water deed from original canal company to defendant a
maximum cost of water was set at $37.50 for each 80 acres of land
irrigated. Defendant elected to remain outside of the Irrigation
District boundaries after same was organized, paid only the $37.50
for water while those in the district paid considerably more. The
lower court held that defendant was entitled to water from all
of the reservoirs of the district, but that the county commissioners
could not set the amount of payments assessable against the de-
fendants for water. Reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court
held that defendants were entitled to water from only one res-
ervoir existing at the time the original grant was made, that the
county commissioners could not assess the payments, and that the
defendants could only be charged $37.50 in accordance with the
original deed. The effect of this holding establishes the rule that
........Colo ......... 255 P. 2d 965 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 225.
0 .....Colo ......... ,255 P. 2d 384 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 235.
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when an irrigation district acquires the water rights and facilities
of a canal company subject to all contracts previously made by
the canal company, it must honor such contracts, even though they
require delivery of water at a rate lower than the irrigation dis-
trict must charge its own members.
Mendenhall v. Lake Meredith Reservoir Co9 was an action
to enjoin defendants' diverting water and for damages therefor,
compliance therewith involving replacement of a dam in the stream.
Judgment for defendants. The Supereme Court upheld the lower
court and restated the well established principle that an appro-
priator of water from a natural stream has a vested right to the
continued maintenance of conditions on the stream as they existed
at the time he made his appropriation, but the court held that plain-
tiff failed to offer sufficient proof to establish his contention.
EQuITY
In Lesser v. Lesser 1 an action was brought to rescind a deed
executed by 80-year-old plaintiff, violently ill, in favor of his son.
The son died 14 months later, leaving defendant as sole and only
heir at law. Plaintiff's testimony was discredited due to court in-
terpreter's inabaliity to interpret his unusual German dialect. Evi-
dence disclosed plaintiff was seriously ill at time of execution, and
that the son was the only child of plaintiff who cared and advanced
money for his father. The property was valued at $1,500, and the
son spent $774.67 for his father.
Trial court judgment reversed in favor of defendant on basis
that close relationship between father and son raised a presump-
tion against the validity of the deed; however, defendant success-
fully assumed the burden of going forward and rebutting plain-
tiff's evidence. The burden of proof did not shift from the plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and there-
fore failed to sustain his burden of proof. To defeat such a con-
veyance something more than exertion of the natural influence
exerted on a father by a son must be shown, such as imposition,
fraud, importunity or duress.
In Sanger v. Larson Construction Company 2 the plaintiff
brought an action for damages of $15,000 for trespass to his land.
State of Colorado entered an ex parte order of condemnation of
certain lands of plaintiff for a road and the "Temporary Posses-
sion" order was served by plaintiff. Plaintiff knew of the intended
condemnation, but had no notice of the hearing. The statute re-
quired none. After completion of the road by defendant with the
consent of the plaintiff, who even leased defendant a camp site,
plaintiff discovered a new Colorado case holding that notice had
to be given in such condemnation proceedings.
-Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 414 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20, p. 319.
........ Colo .......... 250 P. 2d 130 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 3, p. 44.
........ Colo .......... 251 P. 2d 930 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8.
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The Court held that estoppel en pais or equitable estoppel oper-
ated to bar this plaintiff's claim even though plaintiff allowed de-
fendant to enter his land under the belief that the temporary order
was valid.
In Ginsburg v. Zager - the plaintiff brought an action for
damages sustained in connection with her purchase of a new resi-
dence property in Denver, alleging numerous misrepresentations
on the part of defendant sellers as to sufficiency of construction
thereof. The lower court was reversed, with directions to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that the damage of which the plaintiff
complained was a result of a condition which developed subse-
quent to the completion of her house and not from any defect in
construction, but from causes not known to exist at the time she
bought the property.
Chamberlain v. Poe 4 was an action for $12,000 damages for
defendant's failure to procure flood insurance on plaintiff's house.
The plaintiff purchased a home, financed same through defendant
loan company. The defendant also wrote the insurance covering
the house and assured plaintiff it was covered with flood insurance.
A flood did extensive damage to plaintiff's house, but the insurance
as written did not cover flood damage. Plaintiff refused to make
monthly payments on his loan so the defendant started foreclosure.
The plaintiff, by telegram, requested the defendant to dismiss fore-
closure and agreed to repair the house at plaintiff's own expense.
Defendant dismissed foreclosure and the plaintiff made monthly
payments under a refinance plan. Plaintiff sued two and one-half
years later.
The Supreme Court reversed the $9,333 judgment of the lower
court with instructions to dismiss the action, holding that plaintiff
is estopped from bringing his action when he obtained a valuable
consideration (dismissal of foreclosure and refinancing) for an im-
plied promise not to sue.
In Sanders v. Gomez 5 the plaintiff brought an action to quiet
title on basis of adverse possession to part of three lots, the re-
maining part of which was occupied by record owners, the defend-
ants. The plaintiff had fenced a portion of the lots. The jury, acting
in this equity case in an advisory capacity, found the plaintiff did
not have open, notorious, and adverse possession for the 18-year
statutory period. The court approved the finding of the jury and
ruled for defendants. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court
and held that the verdict of jury is advisory only in equitable ac-
tions; however, judgment in quiet title action will not be disturbed
if supported by the evidence.
In Eitel v. Alford 6 the plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought
an action against the defendants, husband and wife, for foreclosure
I ........ Colo ......... 251 P. 2d 1080 (1952). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, p. 115.
4 ........ Colo ......... 256 P. 2d 229 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 182.
........ Colo ........ 255 P. 2d 972 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv Sh. No. 17, p. 261.
6 ........ Colo ........ 257 P. 2d 955 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv.. Sh. No. 18, p. 277.
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of two deeds of trust covering certain real estate. The defendants
counterclaimed for rescission of the procedure contract and can-
cellation of the deeds of trust and notes, alleging wrongful delivery
to plaintiff of note and deeds of trust by defendant bank.
The plaintiffs had sold real estate to the defendant under a
contract presumably agreeing not to close the deal until the title
was approved. Defendant closed the deal anyway and then the
title was found defective. The defendant urges that defendant
bank was to hold the papers until approval of title under the con-
tract. The Court found no such agreement and that defendant made
no complaint to the plaintiff upon discovery. The plaintiff alleged
that he stood ready to clear title at any time. The defendant sub-
sequently defaulted on the notes and deed of trust after making
certain payments thereunder. The Supreme Court held for the
plaintiff, against the defendant on the counter claim, and granted
foreclosure. The Court held that parties to a contract must exercise
reasonable business prudence. A contract will not be rescined be-
cause of ignorance of certain facts by one party when full infor-
mation was readily available to him and he accepted the fruits of
the contract for a long period. This principle applies even though
the contract may be the result of mutual mistake or actual fraud.
Rogers v. Fitzsimmons 7 was an action for cancellation and
rescission of contract of purchase. Plaintiff bought mountain lots
from defendant. Jury found that defendant represented to plaintiff
that the lots were of a certain size. Thhe lots were in fact smaller,
resulting in a loss of a sale for plaintiff. Plaintiff paid two monthly
payments under the contract after discovering the discrepency and
and then brought this action.
The Court held: (1) Payment after discovery did not consti-
tute waiver of the right to rescind-it was merely preserving the
rights of both parties should decree go against plaintiff; (2) Plain-
tiff had the option of two remedies: (a) damages or (b) equitable
rescission; (3) Misrepresentation is ground for rescission of a
contract-one can continue payments required by a contract with-
out waiving his right to rescission of the contract.
SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE
"Rule 217 concerning admissions to the bar, be and the same
is hereby amended to read as follows:
"217. Subsequent Examinations. Any applicant in Class C or
D who fails on examination to obtain a passing grade may take
the next succeeding examination. If he then fails he may be per-
mitted to take a third examination upon a detailed showing which
indicates systematic study, and then only by special permission of
the court en bane.
"No further examinations will be permitted."
Adopted by the court en bane, November 23, 1953. Effective
July 15, 1954.
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 420 (1953). 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19, p. 289.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
WAR POWERS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND TAXATION
GLENN G. SAUNDERS of the Denver Bar
This review covers the fields of public utilities, administrative
law, war powers, local government and taxation. With a single
exception it may be stated that no new principles of law have been
announced during 1953 to this time in these fields of law. This
does not mean that the Supreme Court has not been busy in these
fields, but rather that it has found occasion to apply well-estab-
lished principles to new sets of circumstances rather than finding
itself presented with new basic problems.
The single exception we find is School District No. 3 v. Perry,'
decided Nov. 17, 1952, an en banc and unanimous decision, opinion
by Mr. Justice Moore. The case had to do with the formation of
a new school district under a statute which allowed a discretion
to the County Superintendent of Schools. The statute made no spe-
cific provision for an opportunity for hearing before the exercise
of discretion by the Superintendent.
In such a case the Court held that validity of the superintend-
ent's exercise of judgment was nevertheless dependent upon his
giving those interested an opportunity to be heard. Although there
is no specific discussion of the point, of constitutional law, it does
appear that in discretionary matters public officials, whether di-
rected specifically to do so or not, should, under our ideas of due
process, afford an opportunity for a hearing to those interested
in order that the discretion may be a well-advised one.
This is in accord with a definite trend manifested by the
court in all matters involving activity by administrative and
municipal officials. It appears to be the view of our Supreme Court
that public officers ought not to lose sight of the fact that they
should exercise their powers for the advancement of the welfare
of the people they serve. Wherever a public officer exercised a tech-
nical, ungenerous view of his duties, not connected with the real
purpose for which he was supposed to operate his office, he found
the Supreme Court puting him back in his place. This happened
a number of times.
The State Board of Barber Examiners found the technical
ground for refusing to permit an experienced barber to practice
his occupation and promptly swept it aside (Battaglia, et al v.
Moore).2 In Prouty, et al v. Heron . the court found it unreasonable
for the Engineering Examiners to. limit the practice of a man to
........ Colo .......... 250 P. 2d 1010, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
2........ Colo........ 261 P. 2d 1017, 1952153 C.B:A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
a........Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 755, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No: 14.
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a phase of that field called "Civil Engineering" in the absence of
any reasonable standard for such limitation.
This attitude was not wholly confined to the executive branch
of the government. When a district court endeavored to step out-
side the judicial field and enter the province of the Fish and Game
Commission, the court was held to the performance of duties as-
signed to it by law. (People ex rel Dunbar, Atty. Gen., et al v. Dis-
trict Court in and for Chaffee County).4 But on the other hand,
when the Fish and Game Departmept, through some over-zealous
employees, unlawfully seized some deer meat from a man because
he was an alien, even after they had issued a license to him to
go out and get the deer meat, the court put that department back
in its place pointing out that the legislature had not forbidden
aliens to have hunting licenses, and that it is for the legislature
to say who may hunt and not for an administrative official.
Along the same general trend of relieving the innocent and
intentionally law abiding citizen from arbitrary and unlawful
action of public officials, is the case of Peterson v. McNichols,5 in
which the City, after exacting an unlawful excise from a number
of its citizens, then passed an ordinance to pay back the money
which the Supreme Court, in an earlier case, had pointed out was
unlawfully exacted. Then the City turns around and decided its
own ordinance in which it had declared that it was simply doing
common justice and decency and equity, was unconstitutional and
void. The Supreme Court found nothing wrong with the City being
as honest as the ordinary business man would have to be and re-
quired the City to make the repayments of the funds unproperly
and unlawfully collected.
Somewhat in the same vein is Mullen Investment Co. v.
Arvada, 6 where the Supreme Court required the town to make
good every dollar of Special Improvement Tax money which it had
collected and diverted for other uses than payment of the inter-
est and principal on special improvement bonds for which the
money had been paid.
There is one very wise decision of the court, People v. Toll Gate
Sanitation District7 which really falls under a subdivision of law
which is not specifically named within the One Year Review, to wit,
the field of judicial legislation. In an opinion which cites all of
the perfectly apparent reasons why the sanitation district law
should be different than it is, but with no more than a simple quo-
tation of the actual statute involved, the court held that a person
qualified to vote is really one registered to vote.
........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 743, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
........ Colo .......... 260 P. 2d 938, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28.
........ Colo ......... , 261 P. 2d 714, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
........ Colo ......... 261 P. 2d 152, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 23,
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CONFLICT OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
ELECTIONS
ALLEN P. MITCHEM of the Denver Bar
CONFLICT OF LAWS
With increased mobility in our population, there will inevitably
result an increase in the number of cases involving Conflict of
Law problems. This fact is demonstrated by a pronounced in-
crease in the Conflict of Law cases before the Colorado Supreme
Court during the past year. The principal issues which may be
classified under the heading, Conflict of Laws, are three in num-
ber: (1) When may a court in a given state exercise jurisdiction
in a particular action? (2) What effect must a court in a given
state give to a judicial determination from another state? And (3)
What law will a court in a given state apply to a controversy
which has its roots in some other state?
The conflicts cases which will be reviewed herein deal with
the first and third of these problems, that is, jurisdiction and
choice of law. The cases falling within the first category present
questions of jurisdiction to grant a divorce decree, jurisdiction in
a personal action based on defendants' domicile, jurisdiction to
grant an annulment decree, jurisdiction to enter a judgment for
past due installments for child support, and jurisdiction to issue
letters of administration. The choice of law cases deal with the
law governing the validity of chattel mortgages and the applica-
bility of foreign statutes of limitations. Consideration will first
be given to the subject of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction for Divorce
The United States Supreme Court has, in the famous Williams 1
cases, laid down the rule that no state will have jurisdiction to em-
power its courts to decree a divorce unless one of the parties has
his domicile in that state. In Colorado, by statute, that party must
be the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must have resided within the state
for one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In
Lawson v. Lawson,2 the plaintiff in the "divorce action was the wife,
a wife who had lived in this state all her life prior to the fateful
day, May 18, 1951, when she left this state to go to Indiana for the
sole purpose of marrying the defendant, a resident of St. Joseph,
Missouri, who was a soldier stationed in Indiana at a military post.
After the ceremony, the newly married couple journeyed by way
of Dayton, Ohio, to Kansas City where the plaintiff alone took air
passage for Denver. The evidence showed that the defendant did
' Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
-2 ....... Colo .......... 261 P. 2(1167, 1952-53 6 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1.
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not make a home for his wife, he did not attempt to do so, nor did
he have any thought of doing so. On May 19, 1952, which was one
year and a day after the plaintiff had left Colorado on this matri-
monial venture, this action for divorce was filed by the wife in
Denver.
The District Court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
concluded that it did not have jurisdiction in the divorce action by
reason of plaintiff's failure to establish residence in Colorado for
a period of one year prior to filing the action, and the action was
dismissed.
This decision is apparently based on the presumption that the
domicile of the wife changes to that of her husband by virtue of
marriage. It would seem that very little evidence should be needed
at the present time to overcome this presumption. The common law
view, that the wife could not have a domicile separate from that
of her husband, has been pretty well discarded, and a recent amend-
ment to the Restatement of Conflicts 3 provides that a wife who
lives apart from her husband may establish a separate domicile.
Jurisdiction for Action in Personam
Since the leading case of Milliken v. Meyer,4 it has been recog-
nized that the fact the defendant is domiciled within the state is,
standing alone, sufficient to empower a state to authorize its court
to enter a personal judgment, providing the service used is reas-
onably calculated to give defendant actual notice of the action.
Rule 4 (f) (1) of the Colo. R.C.P. authorizes personal service out-
side the state in such cases.
In Kellner v. District Court,5 the plaintiff sought cancellation
of a contract and damages from a defendant who had admittedly
resided in Denver until he sold his house to plaintiff. Defendant
thereafter, and before this complaint was filed, moved from this
state and went to California where he was personally served a
summons issuing from the Denver District Court. The principal
issue in the case was whether defendant's domicile had changed to
California at the time the action was commenced.
The evidence offered on behalf of defendant to establish de-
fendant's intention to change domicile was abundant. He had se-
cured employment in California, he had bought California auto-
mobile license plates, he had registered to vote in California, and
he had bought town lots there. The Colorado court held that de-
fendant's domicile had changed to California by the time this ac-
tion was commenced, and the District Court therefore had no
jurisdiction. The court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
defendant had become a registered voter in California which was
a criminal offense in that state if the registrant hadn't truthfully
"pledged allegiance" to the state of California.
ISec. 28 (1948 amendment).
4 311 U. S. 457 (1940).




Owen v. Owen e is a case which has caused considerable com-
ment among lawyers in this state. The plaintiff and defendant went
through a marriage ceremony in Texas in 1946, and the husband
(defendant) was at all times a resident of Texas. The plaintiff
brought the action in the Denver District Court to annul the
marriage on the ground that the defendant was mentally incompe-
tent at the time of the ceremony. Service of the summons was made
on the defendant in person in Dallas, Texas. A motion by the de-
fendant to quash the summons and dismiss the complaint had been
sustained by the trial court.
Under Rule 4 (f) (2), the type of service here used would be
sufficient in an action affecting specific statutes or in a proceeding
in rem. The court stated that the state of the domicile of one of
the parties is generally recognized as having jurisdiction for an
annulment of a marriage entered into elsewhere, but that such
jurisdiction may not be exercised on a constructive service upon
the non-resident defendant by publication or personally without the
state. The Colorado court said that a divorce action unquestionably
is an action in rem. 7 While there was little discussion in the case
as to whether an annulment action did affect specific status under
our rules, the effect of the decision seems to be to deny that an
annulment action does so affect ones status, and for jurisdictional
purposes, the annulment action is to be treated as an action in
personam.
If personal service within the State is to be regarded as es-
sential in an annulment action, then such service would seem to be
jurisdictional, and the jurisdiction requirements in an annulment
action would thus be twofold. One of the parties must have a domi-
cile in the State, and the defendant must be personally served
within the state. These jurisdictional requirements are then more
exacting than those in the usual action in personam where out-of-
state service is permissible where it is reasonably calculated to
give the defendant actual notice of the action pending against
him. It is noted that the 1953 Tentative Draft of Amendments to
the Restatement of Conflict Laws, section 115, reaffirms the posi-
tion that "a state has judicial jurisdiction to nullify a marriage
from its beginning under the same circumstances which would
enable it to dissolve the marriage by divorce."
Jurisdiction to Enter Judgment for Past Due Child Support
In the case of Burke v. Burke," a wife had obtained a Colorado
divorce from her husband, in 1935, a decree for custody, and an
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 581, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19.
In the first Williams case, supra, the Supreme Court said, "We likewise
agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem presented in this case to
label the 'proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a
mere in personam action .... They involve the marital status of the parties."9 ........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 740, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
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order for $30 per month child support. By August 1951, after the
husband had established a residence in California (and the husband
had paid $520 under decree), the husband was $4,305 in arrears.
The wife at that time applied to the Denver District Court to re-
duce the amount of arrears to a judgment, without notice to hus-
band. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount in ar-
rears was sustained, the court pointing out that since each install-
ment which matures under the decree becomes a final judgment
debt upon which execution may be issued, the judgment entered
below amounted to nothing more than merely a rotation of record
of the amount then due under the original decree. It was a simple
matter of judicial addition, and the husband was not entitled to
any notice.
Jurisdiction for Administration
Wheat v. Delahay 9 presents an interesting problem in juris-
diction to grant letters of administration. In that case two Camp
Carson soldiers were involved in an automibile accident and both
died. An administrator for the estate of Albert, one of the deceased
soldiers, was appointed by the court of his domicile in Georgia.
The widow of Leonard, the other deceased soldier, though she had
a claim for relief against Albert's estate for wrongful death, the
problem was to find jurisdiction in Colorado for the appointment
of a local administrator of Albert's estate so the action could be
maintained in Colorado against such administrator. Such juris-
diction would have been present if Albert had assets in Colorado
at the time of his death. The district court quashed the appoint-
ment of the administrator which had been made by the county
court, and the action was dismissed
While the action might have been disposed of on the ground
that the application for appointment of an administrator was
made more than one year after the death of the decedent, the su-
preme court gave an additional ground for affirming the district
court's opinion in that the decedent, Albert, had no assets in Colo-
rado to justify an appointment of an administrator at the time of
Albert's death. His wrecked automobile was in this state and it
was also claimed by the plaintiff that the decedent Albert's right
of exoneration under his indemnity insurance policy constituted
assets in this state in that the insurance company was amenable
to process in Colorado.
As to the wrecked automobile, the court disposed of that by
saying that when the Georgia administrator for Albert's estate
disposed of the automobile, it was thus out of the reach of Colo-
rado creditors. One might question whether the Court's decision
on this point was satisfactory in view of the usual rule that juris-
diction to grant letters of administration is based on the existence
..-..... Colo .-....... 261 P. 2d 493, 19.52-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28.
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of assets within the state either at the time of death or at the
time of appointment. 0
In holding that the indemnity policy did not constitute suffi-
cient assets, the county court cited with a approval a Kansas case
wherein the Kansas court said that if such rights constitute assets,
the situs of such assets is at the domicile of the non-resident. Of
course, such assets being intangible, they do not have a "situs" at
all. Under decision of the United States Supreme Court the debt
may be reached by approximate process whereby the debtor (here
the insurance company) may be personally served.1" It would seem
that the court should adopt a liberal policy in granting letters of
administration for the protection and convenience of creditors
within this state. The decision of the court in this case is directly
contrary to that of a well-known Massachusetts case of Gordon v.
Shea,12 wherein, the Massachusetts court said, "When a creditor
is concerned, administration may be granted where a prima facie
case is made out to authorize the granting of administration within
the state. "The object of appointing an administrator is not to de-
termine the rights of parties interested in that estate, but to have
a legal representative of the estate of the deceased within the
Commonwealth, against whom or through whom those rights may
be asserted."
Law Governing Validity of Chattel Mortgages
While the validity of a chattel mortgage as creating interests
in personal property is usually governed by the law of the situs of
the chattel at the time of the execution of the mortgage, in the case
of Trans America Corporation v. Merrion & Wilkins,l3 there arose
a question as to the validity of a mortgage which had been executed
in Oregon, where the chattels, lambs, were located, and the Colo-
rado court said that the mortgage was valid because it was valid
,"under the laws of Oregon and Colorado and the generally recog-
nized rule." It may be assumed that the law with which the court
concerned itself was the law of Oregon, and although Colorado
cases on this point bs well as upon the question of a subsequent
waiver of the mortgage lien would seem to have no application, sev-
eral cases were cited and relied upon.
A second chattel mortgage case involved the interpretation
of Colorado's rather new Certificate of Title Act for Motor Ve-
hicles. This was the case of Bank of Ogallala v. Chuck Lowen, Inc.'
4
Among other things, this Act provides that no mortgage on a
motor vehicle which has been recorded in any other state shall
be recognized as valid and enforceable against subsequent pur-
chasers, creditors, or mortgagees having no actual notice thereof,
except where the certificate of title bears some notation thereon
10 Restatement of Conflicts, sec. 467 (a).
11 Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 (1904).
"300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. 2d 105 (1938).
S........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 391, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
........ Colo ........ ,261 P. 2d 158, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28.
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of the outstanding security interest. The Act also provides that
no person shall sell a vehicle without delivering to the purchaser
a certificate of title, and that no purchaser shall acquire any right,
title, or interest in a vehicle unless he obtains a certificate of title.
An exception to this latter provision exists where a dealer, licensed
in Colorado, sells a new car. Such dealer may transfer title by
bill of sale.
In the Bank of Ogallala case, a Nebraska dealer, after receiv-
ing a manufacturer's certificate of origin for a Packard, mortgaged
the car to the Nebraska bank, delivering to the bank the certificate
of origin. This mortgage was not recorded, but under Nebraska
law recording was not necessary to protect the interest of the
mortgagee who had received and retained the certificate of origin.
The Nebraska dealer subsequently sold the Packard to Chuck
Lowen, Inc., stating that the car was free of encumbrances, and
giving Lowen an ordinary bill of sale. Lowen thereafter, sold the
car to a Colorado purchaser giving a dealer's bill of sale. This
action was commenced by the Nebraska bank against Chuck Lowen
for conversion, the bank contending that as Chuck Lowen acquired
no interest in the car, his sale to the purchaser was a conversion.
A summary judgment for defendant in the trial court was re-
versed.
The Supreme Court held that, under the Colorado statute,
Chuck Lowen acquired no title to the car, having obtained no cer-
tificate of title from the Nebraska dealer, and that the exception
permitting use of a bill of sale when a car is obtained from a dealer
did not apply here, because a "dealer" within the meaning of this
exception is a dealer licensed in Colorado.
The court further held that the interest of the Nebraska bank
as mortgagee would be recognized in this state, even though the
mortgage had not been recorded in Nebraska. The court said that
it was not the recording in Nebraska that would affect the validity
of the mortgage, but the existence of a notation of the mortgage
on the certificate of title. Here there was no such notation, in fact,
Lowen did not receive a certificate of title, therefore, the interests
of the Nebraska mortgage should be recognized in this state as a
matter of comity.
Applicability of Foreign Statutes of Limitation
There were two conflict cases decided during the year involving
the application of statutes of limitation of other states. Of course,
the statutes of limitations of other states will have no operation
in Colorado courts in most instances, since they are usually pro-
cedural. However, in those circumstances where the foreign limi-
tation is substantive, it will bar an action in any state. Also, even
procedural limitations of other states may be applicable in Colo-
rado by virtue of our borrowing statute,15 which provides that an
1 C.S.A., c. 102, Sec. 17.
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action arising in another state shall not be maintained in this
state if it could not be maintained in the state wherein it arose.
The two cases previously referred to involve an application of this
borrowing statute.
In Trans America Corp. v. Merrion & Wilkins,16 an Oregon
mortgagor had contracted to sell a number of mortgaged lambs
to the defendant, without first having obtained permission from
the mortgagee, in whose shoes the present plaintiff stood. Pursuant
to this contract with defendant, the lambs were delivered by the
mortgagor to a carrier in Meacham, Oregon, f.o.b., for shipment
to defendants in Ogden, Utah. Emphasis was placed on the fact
that all freight charges were paid by the defendant. The lambs
were delivered to the carrier August 8, 1940, and received by
defendants at Ogden, Utah, on August 10. Plaintiff, as mortgagee,
brought this present action for conversion of the lambs. Defendant
pleaded a three year statute of limitations of the State of Utah.
The court held that the conversion took place in Oregon and
not Utah, for the delivery of the lambs to the carrier in Oregon
was delivery to the agent of defendant. The cause of action having
accrued in Oregon, the Utah statute of limitations would have no
application. No Oregon statute of limitations was mentioned in
the opinion.
It should be noted that even had the conversion taken place
in Utah, the Utah statute of limitations, being procedural, would
not by its own force be controlling in a Colorado court, but only by
virtue of the Colorado borrowing statute, and this Colorado statute
was nowhere mentioned in the opinion.
The second case involving statutes of limitations is Smith v.
Kent Oil Co. 7 An action had been commenced in the Denver District
Court in February, 1946, on a note executed and payable in Kansas
more than six years earlier. The defendant pleaded the statute of
limitations apparently without designating which statute or which
limitation he was relying upon.
The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, hold-
ing that sec. 17, Colorado's borrowing statute, would not aid the de-
fendant, for there was no plea nor proof of any bar by the laws of
Kansas where the claim arose, and the court could not take judicial
notice of Kansas statutes or presume that they were the same as
Colorado statutes.
The most difficult problem for the court to dispose of was
whether a local statute of limitations of Colorado barred the a-
tion. Section 18 provides a six year limitation for actions com-
menced in Colorado courts and which arose outside the state. How-
ever, the court said that this section must be construed together
with our tolling statute, section 27, and that the six year period
' upra, n. 13.
1-7------.Colo . ........ 261 P. 2d 149, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
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described in section 18 did not commence to run until the defend-
ant came into the state.
It wasn't shown in this case when defendant came into the
state; however, there was evidence that he was still in Kansas
within four years of the commencement of the action in Colorado.
Consequently, the defendant had not brought himself within any
permissible limitation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The case of Prouty v. Heron "s presents the question of the
power of the legislature to place limitations on the profession of
an engineer by classifying him as a civil engineer after he had
previously been licensed as an engineer without such restriction.
The case also involves the validity of a statute empowering a state
board to make such classifications.
The court held that the legislature has no power by statute
to abridge the valuable property right, of one who has qualified for
admittance and license to practice engineering without restric-
tion, "in any manner except for cause and after due notice and a
fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal." The Court
here used rather strong language. It would seem that an abridge-
ment of such property right could conceivably be a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power. At least the case will bear
careful scrutiny by attorneys who have been asked and may be
asked in the future to subscribe to a program of compulsory bar
integration.
It appears, however, that the court's strong language on the
subject of the legislative power was unnecessary to the decision
of the case, for the court further held the statute in question un-
constitutional, because of an illegal delegation of legislative power
to the state board. The statute contained no definition of any par-
ticular branch of engineering and fixed no standards by which
the classifications were to be made. The entire basis for classifica-
tion was left by the statute to the board's own discretion.
In Hazlet v. Gaunt,19 the plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers,
challenged the validity of the 1949 School District Reorganization
Act contending (1) that, as the Act permitted existing districts
to be dissolved and incorporated into larger, newly formed dis-
tricts against the wishes of the majority of citizens in the old
district, there was a violation of the right of due process of law;
and (2) that the Act contained an illegal delegation of legislative
power.
As to the first contention, the court held that consent of
neither the districts nor the inhabitants thereof is a prerequisite
to changing the boundaries or dissolution of school districts, or to
the transfer of assets from an existing district to a new and larger
Is ........ Colo -......... 255 P. 2d 755, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh, No. 14.
"9126 Colo. 385, 250 P. 2d 18R (1952).
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district. The control of school districts and school property is in
the state, and individual taxpayers have no such property interests
in school assets as is protected by the U. S. Constitution against
deprivation thereof without due process of law.
In so far as the alleged unlawful delegation of powers is con-
cerned, the court found that section 12 of the Act set up sufficient
standards for the guidance of those authorized to administer the
law and that due to the fact that the legislature has almost un-
limited power under our constitution over such districts, it could
delegate broad discretionary powers to administrative bodies to
be exercised under the conditions and in agreement with the type
of standards here set forth.
Sovereign Immunity
Two cases presented the question of immunity of the State
Highway Department from suit in controversies arising out of
contracts to which the Highway Department was a party. The
first was Boxberger v. State Highway Department,20 where the
plaintiff, after executing a deed to the Highway Department of
access rights to and from a portion of his farm brought an action
to cancel the deed and for a declaration that it was void because
of alleged misrepresentations and mutual mistake. A motion to
dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity was granted by the trial
court, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying that plaintiff's
claim was founded upon his constitutional right not to be deprived
of his property without due process of law or without just com-
pensation; that the courts are open to afford that protection to
citizens whether their rights have been invaded by individuals or
any branch of government; that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity is not applicable in such case; and the action can be main-
tained.
In the second case, State Highway v. Dawson,2 the plaintiff
brought an action against the department to recover the agreed
price for gravel taken from plaintiff's land. Funds had been ap-
propriated and "ear marked" for the particular project, and the
principle contention of the state was immunity from suit. The
court felt that its opinion in the Boxberger case disposed of this
contention and that neither the state nor any of its departments
should be allowed to have its cake and eat it too.
Statutes
A decision of particular interest to attorneys is that concern-
ing Interrogatories from the House of Representatives 22 relative
to the validity of legislation enacting the Colorado Revised Statutes
of 1953 as the statutory law of the state and repealing all statutes
" 126 Colo. 438, 250 P. 2d 1007 (1952).
126 Colo. 490, 253 P. 2d 593 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 254 P. 2d 853 (1952-53), C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 13.
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of a general nature not included therein.
The most serious doubts on the part of legislators related to
the constitutional requirement that no bill shall be passed contain-
ing more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its
title. The court disposed of this matter by saying that such con-
stitutional limitations were designed for the enactment of new
laws and the repeal or amendment of existing laws and have no
application to general revisions of existing law.
The effect of the new statutes then will be not merely evidence
of the law, but the law itself. So for the first time in Colorado his-
tory, the practicing attorney will be safe in disposing of his 19th
century session laws.
Pari-Mutuel Racing
In Ginsberg v. Centennial Turf Club,'23 the Supreme Court up-
held the validiity of the pari-mutuel racing statute of 1949 against
a contention that it was a violation of section 2, Article XVIII of
the Colorado Constitution which prohibits lotteries or gift enter-
prises. The court recognized that both lotteries and pari-mutuel
betting are forms of gambling, but took the position that pari-
mutuel betting was not itself a lottery. The distinction drawn be-
tween the two was that a lottery was based entirely upon chance
whereas a patron of the tracks might make a more or less informed
selection of his animal. For those whose experience is such that
this distinction fails to convince, the court points to the rule that
all doubts are resolved in favor of the validity of a legislative act.
Elections
In Swanson v. Prout,24 the court held that the activities which
take place at a meeting of the electors of school districts in voting
on a proposed consolidation of school districts do not constitute
an "election" within the meaning of statutes governing election
contests. Consequently, the county court, being a court of limited
jurisdiction, has no authoritiy to hear a case involving the resolu-
tion of the voting at such meeting. Such controversy is not an elec-
tion contest.
Cox v. Starkweather 25 deals with the eligibility of a person
elected as County Commissioner to hold such office. Section 10,
Article XIV, of the Colorado Constitution provides that no person
shall be eligible for any county office unless he shall be a qualified
elector. To be a qualified elector the statutes require, among other
things, that the person must have resided in the ward or precinct
for 15 days. A fair inference to be drawn from other statutes is
that the County Commissioners must reside within the district
which they represent.
126 Colo. 471, 251 P. 2d 926 (1952).
2 --------.Colo.-., 259 P. 2d 280,1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 24.
........ Colo ...... *.., 260 P. 2d 587, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
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This case presents the problem of whether a candidate for the
office of County Commissioner must be a qualified elector in the
district which he seeks to represent at the time of the election or
whether it is sufficient that he be a qualified elector in such dis-
trict at the time he takes office. The court held that eligibility was
to be determined at the later time and whether or not the candi-
date was qualified at the time of election was immaterial.
The case of People v. Proposed Toll Gate Sanitation District,-"
decided June 1, 1953, presents a problem of interpretation of a
confusion in the legislation relating to the formation of sanitation
districts. The court found the 1949 statute quite inadequate in that
it purported to repeal former legislation and re-enact parts of the
former statutes. Apparently the newer statute left out a great
many of the procedural steps in organizing such districts. The
organization of the Toll Gate Sanitation District was challenged
on various grounds relating to the conduct of the election which
proported to give rise to it. The court held that the election was
improper and that the order of the District Court establishing the
district should be set aside, holding that under the 1949 Act no
elector is qualified to vote in such election unless he resides in
the district, and the fact that the elector paid taxes on the prop-
erty within the district was not sufficient.
The court further held that an elector was not qualified to
vote in such election merely because his or her spouse paid taxes
on property within the district. And, finally the court held that
printed ballots used in the election which were designated as
"Official Ballots" were improper in that the statute contained no
nomination procedure and that the legislation apparently contem-
plated the use of a blank ballot.
From the language which the court used in discussing the con-
fused state of legislation, it is apparent that there is definite need
for legislative clarification on this problem.
........ Colo .......... 261 P. 2d 152, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 23.
A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ -------.........-------- ,to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
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BANKS AND BANKING, INSURANCE, TORTS
DUDLEY I. HUTCHINSON, SR. of the Boulder Bar
BANKS AND BANKING
Carrol v. Bank I was the only case regarding banking law
decided, wherein it was held that a bank is not liable for damages
in refusing to allow a depositor to draw against the proceeds of a
deposited check until such check has been cleared.
INSURANCE
In the case of Insurance Company v. Heller 2 the Court states
that the provisions of an insurance policy which are written in
plain and unambiguous language and do not contravene some prin-
ciple of public policy will be strictly construed against the insured,
regardless of how disadvantageous such construction might be to
the insured.
In the case of Reed Auto Sales v. Empire Delivery Service,3
it was held that under a loss payable clause, both the mortgagor and
the mortgagee may join as real parties in interest when the amount
of the loss is equal to or in excess of the amount of the mortgage,
but that the mortgagee is the real party in interest when the
amount of loss does not exceed the amount of the mortgage.
In the case of Insurance Company v. Mitchell,4 it was held
that an insurance company is not estopped from denying liability
under the terms of a policy, after first securing a non-waiver agree-
ment from the insured, even though such company enters an ap-
pearance for the insured and actively participates in the trial
which ends in a verdict for the plaintiffs.
The case of Traders Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Mutual 5 in-
volved a garage owner's liability policy which provided that any
insurance provided therein with respect to the automobile owned by
the insured, should conform to the provisions of the motor vehicle
financial responsibility law with respect to any such liability aris-
ing from the use of such automobile. The Court ruled that coverage
under such policy, the accident occurring where one was driving
the automobile owned by the insured and with his permission,
attached since that provision placed the policy within the terms
of c. 16, § 56, Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935). The effect of this decision
was to greatly broaden the coverage under garage owners' lia-
bility policies which Lheretofore had enjoyed restricted coverage.
TORTS
Three cases have been decided within the past year relating
1 126 Colo. 377, 249 P. 2d 540 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 966, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 254 P. 2d 1018, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 21, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 862, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 25, 1953).
....... Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 776, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (June 6,.1953).
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to the Colorado Guest Statute. The first case, Havis v. Iacovetto,6
raised the question of whether a passenger for hire, while engaging
in an unlawful activity (a professional gambler) is prevented
from avoiding the provisions of the Guest Rider Statute. The
Supreme Court held in this case that recovery by the professional
gambler was not barred even though his activities were unlawful
so long as his participation in such unlawful activity had no casual
connection with the injury complained of.
In both the case of Clark v. Hicks 7 and Dameron v. West,"
the Court clearly set forth what requirements must be met in order
to satisfy the provisions of the Colorado Guest Rider Statute. The
Court states that even though a driver has no intent of injuring
his passenger, if he was conscious of his conduct and from the
knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions,
knew or should have known that to continue his course of conduct
would naturally and probably result in injury, then the require-
ments of the Statute have been met.
In the case of Rosa v. The Union Pacific Railroad,9 the trial
court's entry of summary judgment for the defendant based upon
the pleadings and deposition of the plaintiff was reversed. The
plaintiff's deposition virtually admitted contributory negligence
but the pleadings injected the question of last clear chance. The
Court held that a sufficient question of fact was raised by the
pleadings so as to preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Three cases have been decided on the application of the doc-
trine of last clear chance; the first of them, Werner v. Schrader,1 °
setting forth an excellent discussion on the application of this
doctrine in Colorado. The Court definitely states that the applica-
tion of the doctrine presupposes negligence on the part of both
the plaintiff and defendant, and also presumes that after such
negligence has occurred, the defendant could and the plaintiff
could not, by use of means available, avert the accident. The Court
states further that contemporaneous negligence by both parties
until the moment of the accident prevents the application of the
doctrine, and in Comer v. Dodd,11 the Court states that in order
for the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, the evidence must
clearly show that the defendant's action were the proximate cause
of the injury. In Patch v. Boman,12 the Court refused to apply
the doctrine in the light of evidence that shows clearly that the
plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
Four interesting cases were decided with regard to the lia-
bility of property owners to persons coming on to their property.
0 126 Colo. 407, 250 P. 2d 128 (1952).
........ Colo ......... 252 P. 2d 1067, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 31, 1953).
8126 Colo. 435, 250 P. 2d 592 (1952).
'...Colo ......... , 252 P. 2d 825, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 3, 1953).
10 ........ Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 766, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (June 6, 1953).
.... Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 300, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
................. 257 P. 2d 418, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (May 9, 1953).
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in Security Building Co. v. Lewis, 13 the Court states that the prop-
erty owner, with regard to liability toward a tenant, is not an in-
surer but rather merely owes a duty toward such tenant of ordi-
nary care and that such duty runs to the safe condition of the
premises and not to the duty of discovery of any defects. In the
case of Atkinson v. Ives,14 it is pointed out that a property owner
owes a duty toward a licensee to refrain from wilfully and inten-
tionally injuring and to use reasonable care after being aware of
his presence on the premises. The Court goes further to state with
regard to an invitee, that such property owner must not negligently
allow conditions to exist that would imperil the invitee's safety,
but that such liability cannot attach unless the property owner has
knowledge of the conditions that caused the injury. Likewise, in
the case of The Denver Dry Good Company v. Pender,5 it was
stated that the property owner is not bound to foresee or guard
against casualties on the premises that are not expected in the
ordinary course of events or which might result from some unusual
or peculiar act of the plaintiff, and that some notice or knowledge
of the particular defect must first be shown before liability can
be established. In the case of Cordon v. Clotsworthy,0 it was held
that an employer owes a duty to the employee to exercise ordinary
care in seeing that a reasonably safe place is provided to work,
but an employer is not an insurer of the safety of the employee
and that any negligence asserted cannot rest upon surmise, specu-
lation or conjecture but must be grounded upon substantial evi-
dence.
In the case of City of Denver v. Dugdale, ' 7 the Court held
that the City of Denver was not chargeable with constructive no-
tice of a slippery condition on its sidewalk which had lasted for
a period of two days and was caused by natural causes. The Court
draws a distinction between a natural accumulation of ice and
snow and an accumulation which is put there by artificial means.
In the case of Sawyer v. Blanchard,18 it was held that sepa-
rate verdicts against the taxi-cab company and the taxi-cab driver
are not proper and that there can be no separate liability since
liability in such case is necessarily joint due to the negligence of
the driver.
In Spillane v. Wright,1 9 the evidence showed that the three
defendants were jointly prosecuting a common undertaking and
each had apparent authority to act for all and that each had done
some small part in the joint undertaking. The Court ruled that
it was proper to instruct the jury that if any one of the defend-
ants was negligent, such negligence would constitute negligence
is ........ Colo ......... 255 P. 2d 405, C.D.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 7, 1953).
14 ........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 749, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 14, 1953).
........ Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
16 ........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 410, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Apr. 25, 1953).
17 -------- Colo .......... 256 P. 2d 898, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 4, 1953).
126 Colo. 485, 251 P. 2d 434 (1952).
'1 ........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 1078, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 4, 1953).
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on the, part of any and all defendants.
In the case of Wetzel v. Bates, 20 the Court again follows the
rule that in order to have negligence, it must be shown that the
defendant was under a duty and that his actions did not measure
up to the requirements and standards of that duty. And in Mc-
Brayer v. Zordell,21 the Court states that if injury could have been
due to several causes, any one of which might have been the sole
proximate cause, it must be shown as between these causes that
it was the defendant's negligence that caused the injury com-
plained of.
In the case of Gossard v. Watson,2- the plaintiff was operating
a pick-up truck following a vehicle operated by the defendant. An-
other one of the defendant's trucks was following plaintiff. De-
fendant's lead vehicle stopped, and plaintiff alleged that his
pick-up truck was pushed from the rear into the on-coming lane
of traffic where a collision occurred with another of defendant's
trucks. Defendant alleged that the plaintiff was following too
closely in violation of the statute,23 and such violation constituted
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court held that a pick-up
truck is not a "motor truck" within the meaning said statute and
further, that violation of the statute is not negligence per se but
that such violation must be shown to be the proximate cause of the
collision. The Court further pointed out the extreme danger of
reciting isolated sections of statutes in the instructions without
explanation or consideration of the facts as shown by the evidence.
In Scott v. Matzuda,24 it is stated that a trial court abuses its
discretion by granting a new trial when the record discloses evi-
dence sufficient to support the finding of the jury. And in Schell v.
Kuflhem,25 the Court again states that every presumption favors
the correctness of the jury verdict and that the findings of such
jury will not be disturbed and reviewed in the absence of a clear
showing of passion or prejudice.
In the case of Herdt v. Darbin,2 6 the Court states that an in-
struction on unavoidable accident is not warranted where the facts
are such that a collision between two cars could have been fore-
seen, anticipated or avoided.
In Kelty v. Swinney,27 dismissal of an action under the Wrong-
ful Death Statute was upheld, the Court holding that negligence
must be shown in order to recover under the Wrongful Death
Statute.
In the case of Postma v. Smith,28 the Court distinguishes be-
........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 291, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 4, 1953).
........ Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 962, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (May 9, 1953).
. ........ Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
"Colorado Session Laws, 1945, c. 80.
........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 403, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Mar. 28, 1953).
0 ........ Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 861, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 25, 1953).
"4126 Colo. 355, 249 P. 2d 822 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 965 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 21, 1953).
n .......- Colo .......... C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (July 25, 1953).
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tween a situation where (1) medical treatment is performed as
contracted for but in a negligent manner and where (2) medical
treatment other than that contracted for is performed; the Court
stating that in the former case it is a matter of mal-practice under
the two-year statute of limitations and that in the latter case it is
a matter of assault and battery under the one-year statute of limita-
tions. Thus, where the plaintiff engaged the defendant to perform
The case of Spears v. Maier 29 involved an alleged libel where
the defendant, a medical doctor, made out and signed a death cer-
tificate for a person who had formerly been a patient of plaintiff's
santatorium, stating that she had died from criminal neglect at
plaintiff's sanatorium. Action was brought three and one-half
years later, and the defendant pleaded the three-year statute of
limitations. The question presented was whether or not the fact
that the death certificate was a matter of public record constituted
a continuous publication of the alleged libel so as to take the case
out of the statute of limitations. The Court held that the fact that
many people read a libel is evidence as to the extent of damage
therefrom, but does not in itself establish publication as to each
reader. The Court held that to rule otherwise would effectively
nullify the statute of limitations. In addition, the Court states
that doctors of medicine are not ipso facto incompetent witnesses
as to any fact regarding the standards of chiropractic medicine,
but rather, the question of competency should be raised with re-
gard to the evidence introduced.
Franzen v. Zimmerman 30 in following the precedent of Giggy
v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 73 P. 2d 1100,
states that a wife may not bring action for loss of consortium due
to the injury of her husband.
Manion v. Stephens ' involves the case of a mysterious dis-
appearance of a certain number of plaintiff's turkeys and a simi-
lar appearance of approximately the same number of turkeys in
the defendant's flock. Action was brought for civil conversion. The
Supreme Court held that the motive with which a defendant acts
and whether with or without ill-will or malice is immaterial in an
action for conversion, and that the action for conversion will lie
even though the act or acts upon which the action is based are done
in good faith, sincerely, innocently, inadvertently or by mistake.
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
ao256 P. 2d 897, C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (April 25, 1953).
"C.B.A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 26, 1953).
RETURN YOUR PLEDGE CARD
Pledge cards for use in making contributions to the COLO-
RADO BAR FOUNDATION have been mailed to all members of
the Colorado Bar Association. The first list of contributors will




CIVIL REMEDIES AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
FRED M. WINNER of the Dcuver Bar
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
By amendments effective November 12, 1952, major changes
were made in the rules of appellate procedure. (1) the most im-
portant of these changes are:
1. The time within which to obtain a writ of error was re-
duced from one year to three months from the date of final
judgment.
2. The requirement for specification of points was eliminated,
and it is now required that the summary of the argument
contain a concise statement of the points relied upon.
3. If under 35 pages (including all appendices) briefs may
be typewritten or mimeographed; if typewritten or mimeo-
graphed, ten copies are filed; if printed, fifteen copies are
filed; if typewritten, one copy is served; and, if mimeo-
graphed or printed, two copies are served.
4. The brief of plaintiff in error must contain a succinct state-
ment of the case in lieu of an abstract of record, and must
carry specific folio references.
5. Requests for extension of time must set forth how many,
and at whose request, previous extensions were granted.
6. Petitions for rehearing may be typed or mimeographed, but
they must be limited to three pages (unless special per-
mission of the Court is obtained) and oral arguments are
not permitted.
INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES BY THE COURT
In two cases the Court held that insofar as the Rules are not
inconsistent with special statutes, the Rules are applicable to
statutory proceedings. Thus, in Boxberger v. State Highway Com-
mission,' it was held that the Rules apply to eminent domain-at
least as to the filing of motions-although it was specifically held
that an answer is not required. Also, in Sitler v. Braians,2 where
the statute allowed 20 days to "appeal" an election contest, it was
held that the 20-day time limit was applicable, although appeals
have been abolished. (1) For a complete discussion of these changes,
see article by Mr. Percy S. Morris.3
The Court held that "the purpose of the 1941 statute (abolish-
ing appeals) seems to be to determine the method, rather than the
time, of review by this court, and the change of method would not
by implication change the time limitation."
The validity of service of process outside Colorado in an ac-
1126 Colo. 526, 251 P. 2d 920 (1952).
' 126 Colo. 370, 251 P. 2d 319 (1952).
0 Dicta, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Jan. 1953).
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tion in personam was involved in Kellner v. District Court.4 Plain-
tiffs contended defendants were residents of Colorado, and, pur-
suant to Rule 4 (f) (1),5 defendants were served in California.
The service was held to be void.
In Ginsberg v. Zagar 6 it was held that the language of Rule
9 (b) : "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity" means that fraud must be alleged with
the same particularity demanded under the code. It was said "The
'particularity' thus required is that which in numerous decisions
we have defined in actions for fraud and deceit, prior to the adop-
tion of our Rules of Civil Procedure."
Smith v. Kent Oil Co.7 emphasized the provisions of Rule 8 (c)
that affirmative defenses must be affirmatively pleaded. It was there
held that a defense of a statute of limitations can not be raised by
motion to dismiss, but must be raised affirmatively by answer.
Joinder of claims under Rule 18 was involved in Colorado
Board of Architects v. District Court.8 There, plaintiff attempted
to join a suit against the Board for a mandatory injunction with
an action of damages against the individual members of the Board.
In holding the joinder to be improper, it was said: "The several
defendants must be charged in the same character. Officers of a
municipal corporation cannot, in the same action, be charged of-
ficially and personally."
Additionally, Colorado State Board of Architects v. District
Court 9 recognized the conflict which before existed in Colorado
concerning the effect of answering and proceeding to trial where a
motion for a change of venue was improperly overruled. Under
these earlier cases (which are reviewed in the opinion) it was un-
certain whether the improper venue was waived if defendant an-
swered. After the decision in Colorado State Board of Architects
v. District Court, it seems clear that defendant does not waive the
objection of improper venue if he answers after a motion for
change of venue has been improperly overruled. The Court said:
"The party who resists a motion for change of venue, to which his
opponent is clearly entitled as a matter of right, does so at his peril.
If the motion erroneously is denied and the moving party suffers
adverse judgment, a reversal of the judgment with direction to
change the venue would certainly follow."
In People v. District Court 10 "venue" was held to be the
equivalent of "jurisdiction" in a divorce case. There, complaint
was filed in Rio Grande County, and it was alleged that the parties
were residents of that county. Later, it was established that both
4 ........ Colo ......... 256 P. 2d 887, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
' Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339.
6126 Colo. 536, 251 P. 2d 1080 (1952).
..-... Colo .......... 261.P. 2d 149, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
1126 Colo. 340, 249 P. 2d 146 (1952).
9 Supra.
10 ....... Colo ......... 258 P. 2d 483, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22.
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parties lived in Denver, and it was held that the trial court was
without jurisdiction. The Court held that the provision of the
statute that a divorce case be filed in the county of the parties'
residence was jurisdictional. It was said: "It is a jurisdictional
question and cannot be waived by the parties. Unless the residence
required by the statute is in some manner shown, the court is with-
out jurisdiction."
The past year has seen two decisions interpreting the discovery
rules. In General Accident Insurance Co. v. Mitchell" it was held
that Rule 34 does not permit the inspection of confidential commu-
nications between attorney and client; and in Ridley v. Young 12
the effect of interrogatories under Rule 33 was considered.
There, defendant made certain admissions in his answers to
interrogatories. He did not appear at time of trial, and other wit-
nesses called in defendant's behalf contradicted his admissions. The
Court held: (1) The admissions made in the interrogatories were
not evidence in the case until the answers were offered in evidence
as an exhibit; and (2) the admissions were not "judicial admis-
sions" in the sense that they could not be contradicted. The Court
said: "we hold that the answers to the interrogatories in the instant
case are not such 'judicial admissions' as to be conclusive against
the defendant Young, and the trial court did not err in receiving
the evidence to which plaintiff Ridley objected."
In Morland v. Durland Trust Company 13 the Court again
pointed out that a summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy,
and that a motion for summary judgment should be granted only
where "no material factual issue remains in the case ... (and only
where) the facts are clear and undisputed." This case presented
the somewhat unusual situation of having both parties move for
summary judgment, and it was contended that under these cir-
cumstances the trial judge was bound to decide the case on sum-
mary judgment. In overruling this contention, the Supreme Court
pointed out that although a motion for summary judgment admits
all facts well pleaded, admission is made only under movant's
theory of the case, and is not binding for all purposes; and it was
said: "The fact that both parties make motions for summary judg-
ment, and each contends in support of his respective motion that
no genuine issue of fact exists, does not require the court to rule
that no fact issue exists."
Rule 59 (Motion for New Trial) was involved in several de-
cisions during the past year. In Morron v. McDaniel 14 the trial
judge entered an order to abate the action until further order of
the court.
Acting under the familiar rule, the writ of error was dismissed
on the ground that there was no final judgment. However, that rule
u ..... Colo .......... 259 P. 2d 862, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26.
12 ........ Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 433, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
18........ Colo .......... 252 P. 2d 98, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10.
........ Colo .......... 254 P. 2d 862, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
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was not extended to cover the situation in Scott v. Matsuda.15 There
a new trial was granted, and plaintiff, saying that he had made
the strongest case he could make, sued out a writ of error. The
Court recognized that ordinarily the granting of a new trial lies
within the discretion of the trial judge, but held that under the
facts of Scott, there was an abuse of discretion. Under the Rules,
the Court has held that ordinarily a judgment is not final until mo-
tion for new trial is overruled. Bankers Co. v. Hall.1 6 However, in
Scott, the Court was not acting without precedent, for it was held
in Mooney vs. Carter 17 (where the question of "final judgment"
was expressly considered) that if the "intention of the parties was
to treat the action of the trial court as though the court had dis-
missed the action or granted a non-suit" the Court would consider
the case on writ of error.
In Goodwin v. Eller ' it was held that the trial court could
make new findings on motion for new trial, and, after originally
holding in favor of one party, could hold in favor of the other party
on the new trial motion. King v. Avila,19 reviewed earlier decisions
under Rule 59, and held that a new trial could be granted on the
question of damages only where, "under the evidence, it can be
definitely said that the verdict is grossly and manifestly inade-
quate, or the amount thereof is so small as to clearly and definitely
indicate that the jury neglected to take into consideration evidence
of pecuniary loss or was influenced by prejudice, passion or other
improper consideration."
The old question of quotient verdicts was raised in Harvey v.
Thorpe.20 The case followed the rule established under the code
that a quotient verdict is ground for new trial only where there is
an "antecedent agreement by the jury to be bound by the resulting
quotient."
There is no discussion in the case of the difference between the
language of the Rules and the Code ;2 and the Court adopts ex-
actly the same test under the Rules as was applied under the code.
Platte Valley Elevator Co. v. Gebauer 21 followed the estab-
lished rule that points not raised in motion for new trial would not
be considered by the Supreme Court.
During the year, the Court had occasion in several cases to
point out that briefs should be filed in strict accordance with the
Rules, and that failure to abide by the Rules may result in dismissal
-........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 403, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
1116 Colo. 566, 183 P. 2d 390 (1947).
17114 Colo. 267, 160 P. 2d 390 (1945).
........ Colo .......... 258 P. 2d 493, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 23.
-........ Colo.......... 259 P. 2d 268, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 24.
........ Colo ......... 253 P. 2d 1062, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
Rule 59 provides that "misconduct of the jury" shall be a ground for new
trial, while the code said, "Misconduct of the jury, and when any one or more
of the jurors shall have been induced to assent to a general or special verdict
; ... by resort to the determination of chance."
........ Colo .......... 256 P. 2d 903, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
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on a writ of error. Mauldin v. Lowery; 2 Spillane v. Wright;23
Clemann v. Bandimer;
24 Hays v. Burnham .25
Kellner v. District Court 26 was an original proceeding, and
defendant argued that the case should be dismissed because no
question of "great public importance" was involved. The opinion
recognizes that there is some confusion between the language of
Rules 106 and 116, but it was held that where it appears that the
lower court is without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will accept
jurisdiction in an original proceeding. The Court said: "We adhere
to, and further emphasize, the statements in Carlson v. District
Court,27 'no question of greater "public importance" can arise than
one in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the per-
son or subject matter'."
2.... Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 976, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 14.
........ Colo .......... 259, P. 2d 1078, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 27.
........ Colo... ....... 259 P. 2d 614, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26.
.------ Colo ....... 257 P. 2d 972, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 20.
... Colo ......... 256 P. 2d 887, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
116 Colo. 330, 180 P. 2d 525 (1947).
Mail your pledge to the Colorado Bar Foundation today.
Remember the Colorado Bar Foundation in your Will. The
purposes of the FoundatioD are set out in the November, 1953,
issue of Dicta.
SHEPARD'S CITATIONS CELEBRATES ITS
80TH BIRTHDAY
In the course of publishing articles of interest to the legal
profession, we pause to note the eightieth anniversary of Shepard's
Citations without whose citation system the preparation of most
of these articles would have been much more difficult than it was.
In 1873, Frank Shepard began providing attorneys in Chicago
with a case citation service limited in scope and cumbersome in
form. Now, eighty years later, there are compact Shepard publica-
tions meeting the citation requirements of every attorney in every
jurisdiction throughout the United States. Basic bound volumes
kept current with periodic cumulative supplements show citations
to every case reported in the state reports and in the National
Reporter System and to every case decided in the federal courts
as well as citations to constitutions, to statutes, and to other reposi-
tories of the law.
As the Shepard organization approaches its eighty-first year,
it may take justifiable pride in the knowledge that its publications
rest securely on the shelves of all complete law libraries.
To commemorate its eightieth anniversary, Shepard's has
published a booklet entitled "Four Score Years of Service to the




CONTRACTS, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP,
PERSONAL PROPERTY, SALES AND
CORPORATIONS
RALPH B. HARDEN
of the Fort Collins Bar
It would be impossible in the space available to this article to
detail all of the cases of interest relating to the above subjects de-
cided in the past year. The following are selected because they
should have the widest application to the general practice of law.
Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of
El Paso County:' Question as to ownership of personal property
(seeds) for tax purposes. The Seed Company contended that title
to the property passed to merchants with whom it dealt, who were
therefore liable for the tax. The county contended that the trans-
actions between the Seed Company and its merchants were con-
signments or bailments and that title remained in the Seed Com-
pany rendering them liable for the tax.
The so-called contracts of the Seed Company with the merch-
ants were order forms of varied terminology signed only by the
merchants and providing for re-purchase of seeds unsold by the
merchants with consequent credit to merchants on invoice price.
Some of the forms contained the words "title passes at Detroit."
It was held that title did not pass from the Seed Company and
that the real natlire of the transactions were sales on consignment
and not "sale or return" transactions or absolute sales. The Su-
preme Court observing that "there is nothing mystifying about the
word 'sell' and plaintiff was not prevented from its use in these
contracts which would have ... removed all doubt" based its opin-
ion on the following: (a) The so-called contracts were unilateral,
signed only by the merchants, and therefore appeared to be con-
tracts of bailment or consignment. (b) The contracts should be
construed against the maker thereof, the Seed Company. (c) The
course of dealing between the Seed Company and the merchants
indicated that the transactions were sales on consignment and this
course of dealing was held to overcome the statement on some of
the contracts that "title passes at Detroit." (d) That the merchants
had to return unsold seed to the Seed Company, they having no op-
tion to keep the unsold seed, which indicated a control and right
of property remaining in the Seed Company.
Lerner v. Stone :2 Previous to this action the plaintiff had been
successful in an unlawful detainer suit against the defendant and
the plaintiff here sought treble damages under the statute for the
unlawful detainer. The defendant counterclaimed and sought dam-
ages on the ground that the plaintiff had breached the terms of a
1 126 Colo. 426, 250 P. 2d 1003 (1952).
........ Colo .......... 252 P. 2d 533, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sb. No. 9.
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contract of sale of a partnership interest previously made between
the plaintiff and the defendant. It appeared that there had existed
a partnership between the plaintiff, the defendant and one
Schwartz which did business under a lease of certain premises in
Denver. The plaintiff notified the defendant that he desired the dis-
solution of the partnership and in conformity with the partnership
agreement made an offer to buy the defendant's interest, including
goodwill, for a certain sum or to sell his interest to the defendant,
including goodwill, for the same amount. The defendant accepted
the offer to sell and apparently a written agreement was made rela-
tive thereto, which agreement did not specifically mention goodwill.
Subsequently the defendant acquired the interest of Schwartz and
operated the business as the sole owner. Subsequently also the plain-
tiff acquired ownership of the leased premises in which the defend-
ant was doing business, gave the defendant notice to vacate which
was not complied with and brought the unlawful detainer action
above mentioned. Upon the defendant's eviction from the premises
under this unlawful detainer action the plaintiff moved into the
premises, established a similar business and sent advertising cir-
culars to old customers of the partnership. It was upon these acts
that the defendant's counterclaim was based.
The decision in this case turned upon the trial courts' ruling
respecting a motion for the joinder of the party, but the Supreme
Court in a matter which did not seem to be necessary to support
the decision, commented upon the defendant's counterclaim as fol-
lows:
It is clearly established that Lerners (plaintiffs),
upon eviction of Stone (defendant), entered into posses-
sion of the premises; sought to establish a competitive
business; and by such action totally and wholly destroyed
the goodwill for which he offered and received a considera-
tion. As hereinbefore stated the "buy or sell" offer made by
the Lerners included "goodwill." While the final written
agreement representing the acceptance by Stone of Ler-
ners' offer is silent as to the matter of "goodwill," it fol-
lows as a necessary implication that the "goodwill" as of-
fered was accepted and paid for, unless specifically ex-
cluded .... [I]n some jurisdictions the rule seems to be
firmly settled that one who voluntarily sells the goodwill
of a business thereby precludes himself from setting up a
competing business which will derogate from the goodwill
which he has sold. That rule has particular application
here because of the circumstances that the "goodwill"
here impliedly conveyed, carried with it the name and lo-
cation of the business ... it follows that there is merit to




This is certainly new, and perhaps surprising, law in Colorado
and should be of interest to any lawyer contemplating a contract
for the sale and purchase of a going business.
Trans-American Corporation v. Merrion:3 In this case the Su-
preme Court points out that consent to sale of mortgaged personal
property given by a mortgagee to to his mortgagor will bar the
mortgagee from setting up his mortgage as against a purchaser
from the mortgagor and that such consent may be inferred; but
that nonetheless such consent depends upon the intent of the par-
ties and is a question of fact for the jury.
This case is also of interest because it treats with the adequacy
of a description of livestock in a chattel mortgage.
Burkhardt v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Savings Asso-
ciation:4 One Horn was the lessor under a lease upon which the
defendant was one of two guarantors of the rental payments. The
guaranty was not made contemporaneously with the lease, but was
subsequent thereto, and by its terms was binding upon the heirs of
the guarantor. Horn died prior to any default of payments under
the lease, but after his death default occuurred and his testamen-
tary trustee brought action against the defendant upon the guar-
anty.
The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff which was
reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded with instructions
to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the guar-
anty by its terms was a special guaranty addressed to a particular
person to which person only the guarantor is liable. Further that
such a guaranty cannot be transferred or assigned to any other
person until a right of action has accrued thereunder, in which case
the right of action would be assignable. Since in this case there
was no default prior to the guarantee's death, no right of action
had accrued and the unaccrued cause of action did not survive the
guarantee's death. This decision was aided by the pronouncement
that a guarantor is like a surety, a favorite of the law.
Rogers v. Fitzsimmons:5 Here the Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment for rescission of a real estate sales contract in favor of
a purchaser against :his vendor on the ground of misrepresenta-
tion. In respect to the vendor's defense of waiver by reason of the
purchaser having made two monthly payments on the contract after
discovery of the alleged misrepresentation the Supreme Court held
that the purchaser was not guilty of laches for there was no show-
ing of a change of position of the parties that would make rescis-
sion inequitable and that the purchaser was entitled to preserve the
status quo by making payments due under the contract in the event
rescission was denied the purchaser.
Kuper v. Scroggins:6 In an action by a purchaser against his
--- ----- Colo .-....... 255 P. 2d 391, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 11.
4 ........ Colo .......... 256 P. 2d 234, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 15.
5-........Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 420, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 19.
* .------- Colo .......... 257 P. 2d 412, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sb. No. 20.
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vendor for specific performance of a real estate sales contract
wherein the purchaser asked for abatement of the purchase price
to compensate him for the vendor's inability to convey mineral
rights which were not excepted from the contract the Supreme
Court stated that a purchaser has a right, if he sees fit to do so,
to accept less than he bargained for and to seek compensation for
the loss of that which he does not obtain.
Eitel v. Alford:7 In a contract for sale of realty providing
that the vendors should deliver abstracts of title to the purchaser
for examination and further providing that in event said abstracts
show good and marketable title the balance of purchase price shall
be paid, there is no specific covenant and promise on the part of
the vendors to insure marketable title. In such a case the burden
is upon the purchaser to satisfy himself with the title, and if not, to
refuse further performance until the title is perfected. If the pur-
chaser completes the payments under the contract without exam-
ining the title and takes the fruits of the contract for many months
without inquiring as to the title when the facts concerning the
same were known to him or readily ascertainable, his right to
rescission is thereby lost.
Self v. Watt:8 This case confirms an interesting and recent
development in Colorado Law respecting forfeiture or foreclosure
under real estate sales contracts.
For a time there existed some doubt in Colorado as to whether
or not a defaulting purchaser under a real estate sales contract was
to be treated as a mortgagor and be entitled to a six month period
of redemption. This doubt was apparently resolved in Miller v.
Temple 9 which held that the sales contract there involved was not
a mortgage and that the purchaser could not be treated as a mortga-
gor relative to the statutory period of redemption. However, the
court, upon equitable principles, gave the purchaser a 30 day re-
demption period.
In this case (Self v. Watt) the plaintiff had sold certain real
property to the defendant under a contract providing for termi-
nation of the contract upon default and a retention by the vendor
of all payments made as liquidated damages. Approximately $18,-
700.00 was paid on this contract which called for a total purchase
price of $35,200.00 when the defendant defaulted in his payments.
The plaintiff brought this action for a decree directing the defend-
ant to pay the balance within such time as determined by the
Court and upon defendant's failure to comply, for termination of
the contract and for delivery of possession to the plaintiff. The
defendant made no appearance and the trial court entered an order
as prayed for, giving the defendant 30 days to pay the balance due
under the contract, and upon his failure so to do, ordered the con-
........ Colo ......... 257 P. 2d 955, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 18.
3 ........ Colo .......... 259, P. 2d 1074 (1953), 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 26, p. 413.
1120 Colo. 546, 211 P. 2d 989 (1949).
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tract to be null and void and possession to be awarded to the plain-
tiff. The defendant's motion for relief from this default judgment
was denied and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court which
affirmed the judgment.
In sustaining the 30 day redemption period ordered by the
trial court over the claim of the defendant that he had a six months'
redemption period the Supreme Court said:
An application for a strict foreclosure under an execu-
tory contract to shut out the iights of a purchaser is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and the
time allowed the purchaser to make payment of the ar-
rears is largely within the discretion of the trial court.
... Equity will take into consideration all the attendant
facts and circumstances in fixing the time. We conclude
that such a period is not the six month's provided in the
statute regarding redemption under mortgage foreclosure.
In the instant case the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in fixing the time which was, under the facts of
the case, both reasonable and equitable.... [T] here are at
least these two cases in our jurisdiction. [Miller v. Temple,
supra, and Gordon-Tiger Mining and Reduction Co. v.
Brown 10] where we have recognized the propriety of a 30
day period within which to make payment of the arrears.
We see no reason in the instant action to depart from our
holding in these cases.
While the period of time may still be within the jurisdiction
of the Court depending upon the equities in the case, this case may
tend to solidify the 30 day time limit, thereby providing by judi-
cial legislation a 30 day period of redemption.
It is interesting to note that it does not appear from the opin-
ion whether or not the contract in question made time of the es-
sence. Prior cases in Colorado and cases in other jurisdictions
have often made this provision determinative in cases of this kind.
First National Bank of Ogallala, Nebraska v. Chuck Lowen,
Inc. :11 In this case the plaintiff bank had taken a chattel mortgage
on a new automobile from one Harney, a car dealer in Ogallala,
Nebraska, and had received therewith the manufacturer's certifi-
cate of origin showing Harney's ownership. This chattel mortgage
was not recorded in Nebraska or elsewhere. Subsequently Harney
sold the automobile to the defendant, a licensed car dealer in Colo-
rado, giving a bill of sale therefor. The defendant then sold the
automobile giving a dealer's bill of sale to the purchaser. The plain-
tiff bank brought this action for conversion and the trial court en-
tered summary judgment for the defendant on the ground of
10 56 Colo. 301, 138 Pac 51 (1913).
........ Colo ......... 261 P. 2d 158 (1953) C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 28, p. 440.
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plaintiff's failure to record the mortgage and a lack of actual or
constructive notice of the mortgage by the defendant prior to the
sale of the automobile by the defendant.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for rea-
sons as follows:
(a) The failure to record the mortgage in Nebraska did not
render it invalid here because under Nebraska Law the mortgage
was valid by delivery of and retention of the manufacturer's cer-
tificate by the bank and under Colorado Law 12 recording in an-
other state is not constructive notice rendering a mortgage valid
against a subsequent purchaser without actual notice. Hence, re-
cording in Nebraska would have been "vain and fruitless by the
laws of both states" and thereby not a necessary act. (b) Colo-
rado has no statute or settled policy rendering such a mortgage
invalid. Respecting our certificate of title act the Court points out
that the import of this act is that acquiring valid title against a
prior mortgagee depends upon delivery of a certificate of title
showing no lien, which in this case would be the manufacturer's
certificate which was never delivered by Harney to the defendant,
except in case of transfer of a new automobile from a dealer upon
the dealer's bill of sale. This latter exception was held not to apply
in -this case because Harney was not a licensed dealer under Colo-
rado Law, an important consideration because if he were a licensed
dealer, his bond would have protected the parties here.
The essence of this case is that clear title to an automobile in
Colorado can be obtained only by possession of a certificate of
title free of lien or in case of a new automobile by bill of sale from
a licensed Colorado dealer.
12 (Chapter 16, Section 13 (31) '35 C.S.A.).
JUDGE PHILLIPS TO SPEAK ON EVIDENCE
At a meeting of the Denver Chapter of the American Statisti-
cal Association on January 19, 1954, Judge Orie L. Phillips is going
to be the speaker and his subject will be "Statistics as Admissable
Evidence in the Courts." All lawyers and Bar Association members
are invited. The meeting will feature a dinner at 6:30 P. M. in
the Pioneer Room of the Student Union Building on the University
Park Campus of the University of Denver.
Reservations may be made by mail to the Secretary of the
Association, Mr. Henry Mosher, c/o Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., P. 0. Box 960, Room 1101, Denver 1, Colorado. Telephone
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